

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 NSC-05 SS-15 ISO-00 PM-04 DODE-00 EUR-12
EA-07 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03
NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06
TRSE-00 /096 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/NTB:RMIKULAK:SI
APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:WSTEARMAN
NSC:JTUCHMAN S/S:MR SEBASTIAN
DOD:DMAHLBERG
PM/DCA:HPHELPS
EUR/CE:GHUMPHREY
EUR/NE:SWORREL (SUBS)
EUR/WE:EBEIGEL
EA/J:EFEATHERSTONE
ACDA/IR:CFLOWERREE
-----190520Z 000214 /20

P R 182213Z MAR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 060918

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, UK, GW, FR, JA

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS
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MATTERS

REF: STATE 050666

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE TO US REPS FOR CONSULT-
ATIONS ON CW-RELATED ISSUES WITH BRITISH, GERMANS, FRENCH,
AND JAPANESE SCHEDULED FOR LATE MARCH.

2. PURPOSE OF TRIP IS TO CONSULT WITH KEY ALLIES ON US CW POLICY ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND MILITARY POSTURE OPTIONS, FUTURE DIRECTION OF CW ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN BOTH THE BILATERAL (WITH SOVIETS) AND MULTILATERAL (CCD) ARENAS. USG WISHES TO HAVE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ALLIES' VIEWS ON CW RELATED ISSUES BEFORE TAKING DECISIONS ON FUTURE US CW POLICIES.

3. DURING CONSULTATIONS DEL SHOULD BRIEF HOST COUNTRY EXPERTS AT SECRET LEVEL ON PRESENT STATE OF PLAY WITH REGARD TO CW ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS, US CW CAPABILITIES, FOREIGN CW CAPABILITIES, POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY POSTURE AND ARMS CONTROL ALTERNATIVES UNDER STUDY IN U.S., VERIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS, AND TACTICAL NEGOTIATION CONSIDERATIONS.

4. REPS SHOULD PRESENT ALTERNATIVES IN NEUTRAL MANNER, AVOIDING ADVOCACY OF PARTICULAR APPROACH. SPECULATION ABOUT OUTCOME OF POLICY REVIEW SHOULD BE AVOIDED. IF ASKED, YOU MAY INDICATE THAT WE HOPE TO COMPLETE REVIEW IN NEAR FUTURE, BUT THAT SPECIFIC TIMETABLE CANNOT BE PREDICTED.

5. TEAM SHOULD SEEK DETAILED VIEWS AND COMMENTS OF HOSTS AND REPORT THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN PARTICULAR, WE WISH TO HAVE VIEWS OF EUROPEAN ALLIES ON FOLLOWING TOPICS:

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--(1) THE CW CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT;

--(2) THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF PACT CW CAPABILITIES;

--(3) THE ADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT NATO CW PROTECTIVE POSTURE AND THE FEASIBILITY OF IMPROVING IT TO A HIGH STATE OF READINESS;

--(4) THE RELATIVE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF THE THREE GENERAL ALTERNATIVES PRESENTED;

--(A) WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO WP USE OF CW?

--(B) WHAT ARE THEIR COMMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL APPROACH?

--(C) WHAT ARE THEIR COMMENTS ON WHAT STEPS NEED, OR NEED NOT BE TAKEN RELATIVE TO THE TWO CW FORCE POSTURE OPTIONS?

--(5) THE CURRENT STATE-OF-PLAY AND FUTURE COURSE OF CW DISCUSSIONS AT THE CCD.

CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPANESE SHOULD BE OF MORE GENERAL NATURE AND FOCUS ON POLITICAL ISSUES.

6. FOR PARIS: ALTHOUGH FRANCE DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN CCD OR IN NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE, WE BELIEVE FRENCH VIEWS ON CW TO BE SIGNIFICANT FROM BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY STANDPOINTS. FRENCH ATTEMPT TO ENCOURAGE NATO DISCUSSION OF CW DOCTRINE AND STATEMENT OF CW ARMS CONTROL IN NOVEMBER 1976 AT UN INDICATE ACTIVE GOF INTEREST IN SUBJECT. (FYI. ON 24 NOVEMBER 1976 FRENCH FIRST COMMITTEE REP MISTRAL STATED: MY DELEGATION WAS HAPPY TO TAKE PART IN THE CONSENSUS THAT HAS JUST BEEN ACHIEVED ON DRAFT

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RESOLUTION A/C.1/31/L.13 RELATING TO CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CANNOT BUT BE PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IS AT LAST EMERGING FROM ITS LETHARGY AND SEEMS NOW TO BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE ACTIVELY THE PRINCIPLE OF A PROHIBITION TO MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHICH IS AN ITEM THAT HAS BEEN ON ITS AGENDA SINCE 1968.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS NOT TAKING PART IN THE WORK OF THE GENEVA BODY, IS NEVERTHELESS FOLLOWING ITS DEVELOPMENTS AND WILL, OF COURSE, STUDY WITH THE GREATEST CARE, ANY DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION THAT MAY BE ELABORATED. WE WISH, AS OF NOW, TO INDICATE THAT WE WOULD WISH THE SCOPE OF THE ENVISAGED CONVENTION TO BE AS WIDE AND AS EXTENSIVE AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT THE BANS ON MANUFACTURING AND STOCKPILING APPLY TO ALL TYPES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABLE OF BEING USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE ALSO REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EFFICACY OF SUCH BANS.

I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF MY DELEGATION IN THE CONSENSUS THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN NO WAY IMPLIES A CHANGE IN THE FRENCH POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. OUR POSITION REMAINS THE SAME, AND THE RESERVATION THAT I AM MAKING ON THIS OCCASION WILL APPLY AGAIN SHOULD A SIMILAR SITUATION ARISE IN THE COURSE OF THE VOTES THAT ARE TO TAKE PLACE. END FYI.)

OUR PURPOSE IN CONSULTING WITH FRENCH AT AN EARLY STAGE
IS TO LAY GROUND WORK FOR FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF RESTRAINTS
WHICH ARE EVENTUALLY NEGOTIATED. AT A MINIMUM, WE WOULD
LIKE GOF TO ACT AS IF IT WERE A TREATY PARTY (AS IN CASE
OF NPT AND BWC) OR, HOPEFULLY, FOR FRANCE ACTUALLY TO
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BECOME A PARTY. DEL SHOULD REFER IN LOW-KEY MANNER TO
THIS US INTEREST.
VANCE

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NNN

Message Attributes

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Sent Date: 18-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
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